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PARADOXES OF PUBLIC SECTOR REFORM: 
THE MEXICAN EXPERIENCE (2000-2007)1 
Mauricio I. Dussauge Laguna2 
INTRODUCTION 
During the last few years, many public sector reform efforts have taken place in 
Mexico. Without question, President Vicente Fox’s government (2000-2006) has been 
one of the most active administrative reformers in the history of our country (Pardo, 
1991, 2007; Sánchez, 2006). The 2001-2006 National Program Against Corruption and 
for Transparency and Administrative Development (NPCT), and the Good Government 
Agenda (GGA) set a wide range of reform issues in the public sector agenda. These 
sought to change the structures, procedures and technologies of public organizations, as 
well as the behaviors and ethical standards of federal public servants. Besides, 
compared to previous modernization programs, it could be said that this six-year long 
reform agenda did not stay just as a collection of good wishes. On the contrary, during 
the last presidential term, numerous and diverse actions focused on building a more 
professional, honest, transparent, digitalized, and top-qualified government were 
implemented (Pardo, 2007). The question to be answered in the following years will be 
related to the adequacy and outcomes of these reform efforts. 
The following pages attempt to recount some “paradoxes” that seemed to have emerged 
during the implementation of President Fox’s administrative reform agenda. Although 
the article has taken into account the relevant literature that has been produced by 
Mexican scholars during the last few years, it should be said that is mostly based on the 
author’s professional experience in the period 2004-2007. Therefore, this is not a 
systematic and methodologically rigorous assessment, such as the kind of studies that 
academics might probably develop in the near future; nor is it a judgment of the 
appropriateness of the reform strategies which were proposed at their time. On the 
contrary, the essay simply seeks to offer some thoughts, which might be helpful as an 
                                                 
1 This is a revised and extended version of the article “Paradojas de la reforma administrativa en México”, 
which firstly appeared in Spanish in Buen Gobierno, no. 2, 2007. The author would like to thank 
Professors Alasdair Roberts, Guillermo M. Cejudo, and David Arellano Gault, as well as the two IPMR’s 
anonymous reviewers, for their comments to a previous draft. He would also like to express his sincere 
appreciation to Maira Vaca Baqueiro, Claudia Huerta, Javier Gónzalez Gómez, and Rafael Martínez Puón 
for their help and advice throughout the writing of these pages. 
2 The author holds a B.A. in Public Administration from El Colegio de México, and a Master’s Degree in 
Public Administration from the Maxwell School of Syracuse University. He is currently studying a 
MRes/Phd in Political Science at the London School of Economics and Political Science. During 2004-
2007, he worked for six months as an external adviser to the Professional Civil Service Unit, and then two 
years as a civil servant at the Executive Secretariat of the Federal Interagency Commission for 
Transparency and Anti- Corruption (both at the Ministry of Public Administration of Mexico). Contact: 
M.I.Dussauge- Laguna@lse.ac.uk. 
  
International Public Management Review - electronic Journal at http://www.ipmr.net 
Volume 9 Issue 1  2008  © International Public Management Network 
57 
 
input for future debates on the reform of Mexican public administration, or in other 
developing countries as well.  
The essay is divided into four sections. Firstly, a brief conceptual discussion on the 
topic of administrative reforms is presented. Secondly, some “paradoxes” that have 
emerged in recent international experiences are described (Hood and Peters, ). Thirdly, I 
try to explain some of the paradoxes that I think appeared during the implementation of 
President Fox’s reform agenda. Finally, as a post scriptum, I will attempt to offer some 
reflections on the current public sector reform efforts that are taking place under 
President Felipe Calderón’s government (2006-2012), with a special focus again on 
some paradoxes that seem to be emerging. 
 
ON ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS 
During the last 30 years, many administrative reforms have been designed and 
implemented all over the world3. Although at the very beginning, Anglo-Saxon 
countries were at the center of the so-called “Global Public Management Revolution” 
(Kettl, 2005), in fact many developed countries, as well as a wide number of 
developing/transitional countries, also began setting in motion substantial administrative 
changes (Suleiman, 2003; McCourt & Minogue, 2001). Thus, along with the 
transformations driven under the New Public Management (NPM) label, many national 
(and local) governments have been implementing several programs of territorial 
decentralization, anti-corruption strategies, creation of accountability institutions, 
freedom of information laws, establishment of meritbased civil services, 
Europeanization of policies. In short, for the last decades we have lived the “age of 
administrative reforms”, as Sabino Cassesse (2003) puts it. 
At a first glance, administrative reforms are (in the simplest and most basic sense of the 
term) a deliberated and programmed effort led by a governing group to change the 
public administration’s structures, proceedings, values, standards, and objectives (Pollitt 
& Bouckaert, 2000). But beyond this, administrative reforms are more than just plans or 
programs for change. They emerge from situations which may seem problematic to 
some people; however, the framing of these problematic situations is not only based on 
concepts, terms, and “better practices” of Public Administration. It is also based on 
values and personal priorities. In that sense, administrative reforms respond to certain 
ideologies, intellectual referents, and value judgments, from which the desire to 
improving the status quo arises. 
At the same time, administrative reforms are symbolic promises. When a governmental 
reform is promoted, it implicitly carries the promise of changing established routines, 
leaving behind old habits, modifying the status quo. And all in search of a supposedly 
superior administrative system: better government, more efficiency, more quality, less 
corruption. The GGA and the NPCT were in this sense promises made by President 
Fox’s government to the Mexican society: a promise to transform public institutions in 
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order to make them work better. They were as well a symbolic complement to the 
democratization process of Mexico’s public life. 
Administrative reforms are also political reforms. They alter the political game rules 
(codes, laws, norms, procedures), and thus they redistribute power between bureaucratic 
and legislative actors who participate in the governing process. The creation of the 
Mexico’s federal Freedom of Information Act, for example, limited the federal public 
servant’s discretion, by giving society an institutional mechanism to have permanent 
access to government information (accompanied also by the creation of the Federal 
Institute of Access to Information, which is an oversight body). Similarly, the 
implementation of the Professional Civil Service (PCS) and its new merit-based 
subsystems for hiring public officials diminished the bureaucratic power that certain 
actors previously had (i.e., the heads of job-vacancies, who were able to appoint 
whoever they wanted). The merit-system reform also brought to this power game 
certain actors that were formerly ignored (e.g. Human Resources departments at the 
federal ministries), or did not even exist (the newly reated Professional Civil Service 
Unit of the Ministry of Public Administration). 
Finally, administrative reforms are quite an active and even profitable industry for some 
actors. Around the world, there are many “gurus”, international consultants, academics, 
and former government officials devoted to debate and analyze, but above all, to spread 
and sell ideas, strategies, tools, and proposals for administrative modernization. In 
addition to them, there are international organizations and aid agencies, which in their 
attempts to strengthening the new democracies’ governance frameworks, actively 
promote (finance) the implementation of administrative reforms considered appropriate 
for developing countries. (Mexico, for example, has received support and financial aid 
from American, British, Spanish, and Canadian agencies, among others). 
Taking into account these factors, what in principle seemed to be just a simple exercise 
of imagination and administrative rationality, reflection and governmental selfcriticism, 
in fact turns out to be a walk through a winding road, full of uncertainties and actors 
interested in slowing down/accelerating/adjusting the modernization proposals. A 
process in which, sometimes even without noticing it, diverse, ambiguous or even 
contradictory administrative principles and practices are advanced (innovation vs. 
stability; citizen’s participation vs. timely response; new technology vs. savings). For 
all these reasons, administrative reforms are complex, problematic, contradictory, and 
even paradoxical, as has been shown by some recent international experiences. 
 
ON THE PARADOXES OF INTERNATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS 
In a very interesting book, coordinated by Joachim Jens Hesse, Christopher Hood, and 
B. Guy Peters (2003), a group of international scholars recently analyzed administrative 
reform processes from a particular perspective: the paradoxes that have emerged during 
the implementation of the reforms, or as a consequence of them4. While other recent 
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earlier work that perfectly exemplifies the usefulness of this perspective for analyzing administrative  
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studies have attempted to analyze international trends of government modernization 
(OECD, 2005), or have tried to assess the impact of administrative reforms (Wollman, 
2003), Hesse, Hood, and Peters’ book focuses on describing paradoxical situations, 
which are “apparent contradictions”, the emergence of ironic, unintended, or 
unexpected consequences that diverse national governments have faced when trying to 
reform their administrative systems (see also Hood and Peters, 2004). 
A first paradox, which can be observed when tacking stock of the administrative 
reforms of the last decades, is that most of the more reformist countries already had very 
efficient government structures (Wright, 1998). For example, it can hardly be said that 
the United Kingdom and Canada had inefficient governments, and yet both countries 
have been in the frontline of modernization practices and doctrines. On the other hand, 
other countries that have traditionally had less effective public administrations (Italy is 
frequently mentioned, but many Latin American countries could be mentioned as well), 
have remained relatively passive regarding reforms. 
Two other paradoxes could be noticed in the light of the efficiency and resultsoriented 
spirit of NPM-based reform projects. For a long time, the Organization of Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the World Bank stated that building more 
efficient governments should be a priority. These institutions also commonly 
understood efficiency as the possibility of obtaining savings (both in time and money) 
in daily government operation. Nevertheless, when reviewing recent reform processes, 
it could be noticed that efforts to change governmental structures and proceedings, can 
be a very expensive task (both in time and money!) (Pollitt, 2003). First, because public 
institutions and civil servants must invest many resources: training hours; design and 
purchase of new technologies; development of more complex monitoring mechanisms, 
etc. Second, because opportunity costs must be added to the quantifiable ones, that is, 
the costs of leaving aside organizational activities or functions during reform time. 
At the same time, neo-managerial reforms have emphasized the importance of setting 
objectives, measuring achievements, designing indicators, and evaluating impacts in 
order to achieve best results. Paradoxically, nowadays there are but a few academic or 
official evaluations about the impacts, achievements, weaknesses, and unexpected 
effects of administrative reforms undertaken around the world. At the same time, it is 
just in recent years that the production of assessment methodologies, which allow us to 
know about changes attributed to administrative reform, has begun (Boyne, Farrell, 
Law, Powell, & Walker 2003). 
Finally, perhaps the most evident paradox throughout these thirty years of 
administrative reforms is that, on the one hand, the ultimate objective of reforms is to 
improve the working of public administrations. Yet on the other hand, reforms also 
generate new problems for government’s daily functioning (Wright, 1998). So it seems 
that administrative reforms are endless, continuous, and that each reform’s 
consequences and effects (beyond their real positive aspects and concrete benefits), 
produce a new and indispensable process of government modernization. 
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ON THE MEXICAN ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM AND ITS PARADOXES 
As it has happened in several international cases, when looking at the administrative 
reforms undertaken during President Fox’s six-year term, it is possible to discover some 
paradoxical situations. Obviously, as Hesse, Hood, and Peters say, the definition of 
what is or is not a paradox depends to a great extent on what the observer points at as 
such. In this sense, the five paradoxes described in the following lines are a personal 
proposal, which may not be portraying the most important aspects of this government’s 
modernization policy. 
First Paradox 
A first paradox of the administrative reform of the Fox administration has to do with the 
following issue: by promoting such an ambitious and wide reformist agenda (which 
certainly includes important topics such as tackling corruption, professionalizing the 
civil service, transparency and freedom of information, e-government, deregulation), 
reformers might have put at risk the success and perdurability of the changes they 
wanted to pursue… 
As Herbert Simon (1997) said more than 50 years ago, civil servants live in a world of 
bounded rationality: the information they can compile; the time they have available for 
decision-making; their capacity to process demands and opinions; and the attention they 
can pay to each issue are limited. Taking into account this institutional setting –which 
perfectly reflects Mexican federal bureaucracies– the administrative reform proposals 
have faced a double challenge. First, the government’s modernization agenda had to 
compete with other public policy issues; each agency’s institutional missions; and even 
the political priorities of top-level federal public servants. Reforming the federal 
government’s machine was a clear priority for the Presidential Office for Government 
Innovation (particularly created with that purpose in mind), and also for the Ministry of 
Public Administration, which historically has been the agency in charge of tackling 
corruption and improving performance governmentwide. Nevertheless, it was hard to 
expect that all other federal institutions (e.g., those which deal with poverty reduction, 
health and pandemics, road-construction) could dedicate the same attention to the 
matter. (Specially, in the case of small agencies, which also have very limited 
administrative support.)  
At the same time, the administrative reform initiatives had to compete against 
themselves. While institutions and civil servants can only devote limited time, 
resources, and efforts to modernizing government, the available attention was further 
divided among reform priorities such as the implementation of the new professional 
civil service; the establishment of the also new freedom of information act’s procedures; 
the design and monitoring of Citizens’ Charters; the implementation of ISO 9000 
regulations; the introduction of newly designed corruption control mechanisms, etc. 
While not every federal agency had to implement all these reform topics at the same 
time, they did have to report on most of them trough various systems coordinated by 
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both the Presidential Office for Government Innovation, and the Ministry of Public 
Administration5. 
Finally, the width and diversity of themes was not only a challenge at an institutional 
level, but also at an individual one. In the first place, those public officials that were 
responsible for guiding the implementation of the administrative reforms at each 
institution also kept their original agency responsibilities. In the second place, it was 
impossible that those civil servants could become experts in every topic in such a short 
timeframe. Each one of these reform topics has its own logic, terminology, and 
“operationalization”, and many of them are normatively and conceptually complex.  
Thus, at the end of the day, the wide range of government reform issues faced a 
competition of priorities; limited time and attention; and organizations and civil servants 
that were kind of exhausted because of the multiple reform processes in which they had 
to participate. Under these conditions, instead of becoming institutional routines, the 
federal government modernizing principles and values faced the risk of simply getting 
“bureaucratized”; that is, in many occasions they ended up just as data included in 
progress reports required by the central agencies. 
Second paradox 
The Good Government Agenda, central piece of the administrative reform process from 
2000 to 2006, was built around six reform strategies: “honest and transparent 
government”; “digital government”; “government that costs less”; “quality 
government”; “deregulated government”; and “professional government”. In this sense, 
an apparent second paradox that seemed to emerge in the past years was that these 
“strategic reform lines” were not as strategically coordinated as they should have been. 
On the contrary, at some points they were confusing and sent mixed signals to public 
institutions. Let us review an example. 
One of the main problems that the GGA intended to solve was the excess of regulations, 
which prevents the federal government from performing in a flexible and innovative 
way. This excess of regulations was perceived both as a barrier for economic 
competitiveness and as a source for corruption. In order to deregulate and simplify the 
language used in official documents, some actions were introduced under this reform 
strategy: the creation of Agency Committees for Regulatory Improvement (comites the 
mejora regulatoria, or COMERIS); the “Lenguaje Ciudadano” (plain language) 
Program; and the deregulation of several public services procedures.  
At the same time, the “quality government” reform strategy promoted, among other 
actions, ISO 9000 certification for federal offices. Even though ISO 9000 certifications 
are designed to standardize processes, and to build schemes of continuous improvement, 
their introduction in government areas (especially in those which do not offer direct 
services, and whose processes and products are not easy to standardize) actually 
generates internal overregulation. That is, exactly the opposite effect of the one the 
                                                 
5 This was particularly the case for the “Sistema de Metas Presidenciales” (Presidential Goals System), 
periodically assessed by the Presidential Office of Government Innovation. However, several areas within 
the Ministry of Public Administration also designed systems for following up on their particular topics. 
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“deregulated government” reform line was looking for. ISO 9000 systems are based in 
the development and writing of procedures, quality manuals and formats through which 
routines, predictability, and quality of services/products might be assured. At the same 
time, public organizations’ performance (in Mexico as in other places around the world) 
is based in a broad set of norms, procedures, acts and rules, which intend to assure a 
predictable and regular performance of the bureaucratic machinery. Thus, when 
introducing ISO9000 management systems there is a risk that problematic and 
paradoxical effects will arise: to the already broad number of internal regulations that 
exist in the government, more requirements, norms, and rules will be added. In other 
words, with the ISO 9000 quality certification process, the Mexican federal 
bureaucracies faced the danger of becoming even more bureaucratized. Consequently, 
the attempt to achieve a quality government apparently clashed with the hope of 
achieving a deregulated government.  
At the same time, the GGA pursued to build a “government that costs less” (as in the 
reinvention efforts of the nineties). However, quality certification processes have 
important economic and opportunity costs, to the extent that audits and pre-
certifications imply an additional budgetary expenditure for federal agencies. Besides, 
they also consume time and public resources, since public officers and institutions have 
to pay attention to other things instead of their work and other substantive duties. This 
means that the “quality government” reform strategy, as followed in the case of ISO 
9000 certification, was not necessarily compatible with the “government that costs less” 
reform strategy. Yet an even more important matter was that, when inserting new 
procedures, norms and standards, public servants were prone to commit mistakes or 
simply behave in a contradictory way, since they had to follow two normative universes 
(administrative law vs. ISO certification), which were not harmonized. At this point, 
paradoxically, the attempt to build a quality government was probably diminishing the 
quality of governmental performance. 
Third paradox 
A third paradox of the Mexican administrative reform agenda of the previous years, and 
may be one of the most remarkable, had to do with the establishment of the new 
Professional Civil Service (PCS). Among the number of issues that were debated in the 
last thirty years, the implementation of a merit-based civil service system was probably 
one of the few that were permanently supported by political, academic, and 
governmental sectors. Nevertheless, as of today it would seem that the PCS is 
paradoxically one of the administrative reform strategies with less support everywhere 
(Martínez Puón, 2007).  
In the academic area, the need to implement a merit-based civil service in the federal 
government (and of course, equivalent systems at other levels of government) was 
highlighted, again and again, by Mexican Public Administration scholars. María del 
Carmen Pardo referred to the topic as an “imperative to the country’s modernization”; 
Mauricio Merino emphasized how important it was to pass from “individual loyalties to 
public responsibilities”; José Luis Méndez underlined that “it seemed that we were 
vainly waiting for the professionalization Godot” (Méndez, 2000). For this reason, 
when the Professional Civil Service Act was passed in 2003, expressions of support 
flooded in among academic groups and the so-called “opinion leaders”. These were 
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accompanied by a myriad of articles in journals and papers in which the historical 
relevance of the issue was emphasized (Dussauge, 2005). 
In the political arena, the interest to professionalize the public administrations was 
explicit from years ago. For instance, during the presidential campaign of 2000, every 
party and presidential candidate’s platform emphasized how important it was to create a 
federal merit-based civil service. In 2003, when a proposed Civil Service Act was 
presented to the legislative power, all political forces unanimously voted in favour of it. 
This was an unusual achievement for President Fox’s government, and was hardly 
repeated during his presidential term. 
Finally, within the Federal government, the new merit-based system was warmly 
welcomed by most public servants. For some of them, the newly created PCS meant the 
arrival of an old wish. For many others, it simply implied the open possibility to 
develop an administrative career based on their own performance and merits, and not on 
their personal loyalties or political links with the governing elite. 
At the end of President Fox’s term, and with only little more than three years after its 
establishment, one could hardly think that the PCS faced a similar situation6. Academics 
and public opinion leaders’ confidence and support vanished, partly because of the Civil 
Service Unit’s lack of interest to publicly explaining the implementation process, or 
debating with subject-matter experts the alternatives that existed to solve some initial 
issues. Meanwhile, political parties and legislators also hardly criticised the new merit 
system. They argued that the system had shown significant failures, especially in the 
hiring subsystem, which was still perceived as highly politicized by both legislators and 
job applicants. Finally, the support from current public servants also diminished. For 
those who coordinated the implementation of the new system in each federal agency, 
the process had been non-transparent and extremely centralized by the Civil Service 
Unit, causing delays and conflicts. And for those public servants who wanted to pass 
from their non-tenured status to a “career civil servant” status one, the procedures to be 
followed were generally perceived as confusing, tedious, and not reliable. 
Perhaps the clearest (and for some the saddest) evidence of this paradox lied in a 
situation faced in the administration’s last year. At the end of 2005, a major political 
party submitted to the Congress a proposal to reform the PCS Act. The proposal lacked 
conceptual coherence and had a clear political objective: for all practical purposes, it 
sought to reinstate patronage over the appointment and dismissal of federal public 
servants. Despite this, there were only a few voices (both inside and outside the 
government) that tried to defend the new merit system; and the legal reform proposal 
was blocked just by a miracle and some last minute negotiations between the Ministry 
of Public Administration and the Congressmen. 
                                                 
6 The Civil Service regulations were significantly reformed in September, 2007, partly because of this 
early “crisis of legitimacy” of the merit system. The final section of this article offers some comments on 
the nature of this reform. 
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Although related to the previous one, the fourth paradox deserves to be treated 
independently: the initial model of administrative professionalization was clearly based 
in a set of managerial skills (leadership, team work, negotiation, results-orientation, 
strategic management), which obviously are also a set of interpersonal skills. However, 
the model was mainly implemented through an e-training system (“@Campus 
Mexico”). That is, through an impersonal (“virtual education”) learning system.  
There is no doubt that on-line training programs can be really helpful. In fact, in our 
times, this kind of education/training might even be essential. When there is the need to 
communicate technical knowledge, homogeneous data, or information that anyone 
could find in a book, on-line education will probably be more efficient than other 
training mechanisms. Besides, taking into account the thousands of public servants that 
potentially can be part of the new merit system (about 42,000), the “@Campus Mexico” 
system might well be one of the few viable options (in both logistical and economic 
terms) to offer the same knowledge basis to all tenured civil servants.  
However, there seems to be at least two contradictions in the way this 
professionalization model (based on the development of managerial skills) has been 
implemented. The first one has to do with a simple fact: not all public servants have to 
learn “managerial skills”. Certainly, those who are in the highest reaches of government 
(in positions which we could call “managerial”), or those who manage people and 
projects obviously require to improve their interpersonal and managerial skills, so that 
they can keep their offices on track. Yet not every member of the PCS is in a managerial 
position. On the contrary, most of them are in middle level, professional/technical 
offices, and have no staff to manage. 
A second contradiction of the e-training system is the following: let us think about a 
public servant at a management level position, who really needs to develop leadership 
skills to appropiately manage her tasks and lead her staff’s performance. Under current 
circumstances, this public servant must turn to on-line courses from “@Campus 
Mexico”, which only offers some tips and theoretical information on leadership. Yet she 
will not have the option to participate in practical trainings. Similarly, a public servant 
who is at a middle level position and must acquire team-work skills (or needs to develop 
negotiation skills) will have to do it by himself, in his office, in front of his PC. And 
here is where the paradox becomes clearly evident: public servants must develop 
interpersonal skills in an absolutely impersonal environment. 
Fifth paradox 
The last paradox to be remarked in these pages is the following one: President Fox’s 
government is certainly the one that historically has set forth a greater number of 
initiatives to strengthen transparency, preventing and reducing corruption, and 
reinforcing accountability in the federal government. However, after those six years of 
continuous reforms, it resulted hard to objectively know whether the federal 
government was doing better than before on these topics. At the same time, it would 
seem as if the public opinion just thought exactly the opposite. 
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At the very beginning of his administration, President Fox created the Interagency 
Commission for Transparency and Anti-Corruption in the federal government 
(December 4th, 2000). This Interagency Commission apparently succeeded in setting the 
fight against corruption as a permanent topic in almost all federal agencies’ agendas, 
and not only as the Ministry of Public Administration’s sole responsibility, as it was 
formerly the case. Furthermore, by means of its interagency (transversal) agreements 
and the agency-specific operational programmes, the Commission has implemented 
actions that probably allowed to preventing and tackling the various types of corruption 
that affect the federal government.  
The “Rendición de Cuentas” (accountability) program; the “Blindaje Electoral” 
program (a policy developed to prevent the electoral use of public resources); and the 
social controllership program are other good examples of how the former government 
sought to transform administrative routines. Regarding the first case, it would be hard to 
say that any previous government attempted to prepare, organize, and publish so many 
“white papers” and complementary documents, so that the new administration could 
have all relevant information about public programs in order to smoothly begin its 
duties; and society could have full access to information on government’s programs and 
policies. In the case of the “Blindaje Electoral” program, the federal government 
developed (for the first time in Mexico’s history) a complete, coherent policy to protect 
social programs and public resources from electoral and political interests (Diaz de 
Leon and Dussauge, 2006). In the third case, federal agencies were continuously in 
touch with several NGOs and academic institutions, and invited them to monitor the 
performance of public sector organizations. This government-led effort to promote 
social controllership and government accountability would have hardly happened in 
previous administrations.  
Finally, in 2002 a new federal Freedom of Information Act was published, with the 
federal government being one of its main designers and advocates. Furthermore, 
towards the end of the administration, it seemed as if the majority of federal agencies 
had fulfilled their responsibilities in terms of the new transparency law: they had 
published through the internet all the information they are required by Article 7 of the 
law; and they had timely replied citizens’ access to information requests. (A revealing 
fact was that, from the total of government replies, only 5% had been submitted for 
revision to the Federal Institute of Access to Public Information, created as an 
independent institution responsible for resolving disputes between citizens and 
government institutions in FOI matters).  
Despite all of these actions and changes, it is not easy to know whether corruption 
levels diminished during the past presidential term or not. Firstly, because measuring 
levels of corruption is not an easy task, and the tools that are currently available may not 
be appropriate for it yet (Sampford, Shacklock, Connors & Galtung, 2006). Secondly, 
and partially derived from the latter point, because there are no assessment 
methodologies yet that may allow us to learn about the effectiveness of our 
anticorruption policies. Thirdly, because the available information for the Mexican case 
sends mixed signals: Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index says 
that the levels of perceived corruption in Mexico have not really changed throughout the 
last 10 years. Transparencia Mexicana’s Corruption and Good Government Survey 
shows that national levels of corruption were significantly reduced from 2001 to 2003, 
but then went up again in 2005 to the original 2001 levels. The Governance and 
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Business Performance Survey (conducted by two Mexican private institutions) seemed 
to show that there was a 50% decrease from 2002 to 2005, in the number of bribes paid 
both by national and foreign enterprises to public officials in order to influence the 
design and implementation of laws and regulations7.  
Beyond this debate on whether levels of corruption were really reduced or not, mass 
media, civil organizations, and the public opinion in general would seem to think as if 
opacity and corruption had in fact increased, as shown by recent research conducted by 
Miguel Basáñez (2006). This could be attributed to many things: the publicly 
broadcasted images in which (former) local public servants appear to be committing 
corrupt acts; some reports in which federal agencies were blamed of classifying public 
information in an incorrect way, or of not having provided the requested information; 
the supposedly inappropriate participation of President Fox in the past federal elections. 
Apparently, all of this seemed to weigh more on the social imaginary than the 
transparency, accountability, and anticorruption policies pursued in the last six years.  
As Ivan Krastev (2004) would say, perhaps what was happening in Mexico towards the 
end of the Fox presidency is not that corruption was at higher levels than before. It may 
well just be that present political conditions allowed the media and citizens in general to 
be more and better informed about corruption cases. And it could seem paradoxical that 




The previous pages have attempted to highlight some contradictions that appeared 
during the implementation of President Fox’s administrative reform agenda. Though a 
systematic assessment of these and other questions will need to be done in the following 
years, this overview allows considering some relevant points on the kind of topics and 
strategies that should be considered in the short term. 
The new government of President Felipe Calderón (2006-2012) will face the challenge 
of designing its own administrative reform agenda. Although the natural trend is to set a 
clear difference with respect to the actions that were carried out in the previous 
administration, a more adequate option would be to firstly analyze in detail which 
achievements have been accomplished to this day. This is because of two reasons. First, 
when comparing the reform strategies and topics of the Mexican government with the 
international trends of reforms, it would seem that there are no huge differences. There 
are obviously different priorities and levels of consolidation, according to each 
country’s context. But most of the issues promoted in Mexico have been present also in 
other countries, including the most developed ones (OCDE, 2005). Secondly, some of 
the reform efforts pursued during the Fox government were designed with a long term 
perspective. In this sense, these administrative reforms (for instance, the creation of a 
merit-based civil service) should not be seen as the triumph of a particular government. 
                                                 
7 For obtaining the exact numbers for each of these surveys, see www.transparency.org; www.tm.org.mx; 
and www.funcionpublica.gob.mx 
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On the contrary, they should be seen as a victory for the whole Mexican society; and 
they should be understood as State institutions that need to be consolidated for the sake 
of all.  
This does not imply that the new government has to keep in its reform agenda the same 
issues as its predecessor. In the upcoming assessment, some topics might endure (e. g., 
transparency, the fight against corruption, professionalization); others might be left 
aside; and newer proposals might also be included, such as the design of better policy 
evaluation systems; the establishment of more inter-agency coordination channels, as a 
means to increase policy coherence; and the development of modern mechanisms to 
invigorate the advantages of public-private partnerships, as well as the creation of 
policydesign/policy-implementation networks, all of which are essential to modern 
democratic governance (Aguilar, 2006; Pierre & Peters, 2000). In the end, what will be 
important is that, beyond its specific initiatives, the new government does not throw 
away all past efforts, but carefully takes advantage of the achievements. 
Furthermore, the new government will also have the challenge of thinking about the 
specific strategies to be followed when implementing the government reform agenda. In 
this sense, the paradoxes discussed here may provide some lessons. In the first place, it 
is clear that the new government should focus the administrative reform agenda in just a 
few issues. This will allow it to make good use of available resources and better 
monitor/assess the proposed transformations. 
Secondly, the new agenda should be more strategic than the previous one, at least in 
five ways: establishing clear priorities since the beginning; setting forth a logical 
implementation sequence to prevent overlaps and competition among reform topics; 
adapting proposals to each ministry’s context and institutions; inserting new 
information technologies as a complementary tool for administrative efficiency and 
professionalization, and not as magic solutions; and timely making adjustments to the 
reform agenda when they are needed. 
Third, it will be necessary for those leading the administrative reform to have a closer 
relationship with stakeholders (academics, public opinion leaders, and legislators) since 
the beginning. Although establishing a dialogue with these actors may be difficult and 
costly, their opinion, advice, and even their critiques will be a helpful information 
source to improve the design and implementation of any reform. Besides, creating and 
strengthening spaces for dialogue can be politically profitable, to the extent that having 
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THE UPCOMING ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM AGENDA: 
THE BEGINNING OF YET ANOTHER ROUND OF PARADOXES? 
In December 2006, President Felipe Calderón began his administration for the period 
2006- 2012. While up to September 2007, the new government’s administrative reform 
project had yet to be officially launched, it is possible to briefly analyze some initiatives 
that had already been advanced. Therefore, this post-scriptum (it was written a few 
months after finishing up the review of President Fox’s initiatives) will attempt to 
provide an overview of these initial actions and ideas, paying particular attention to both 
their paradoxical aspects and (probable) unintended effects. 
The first measure taken by President Calderón was the publication (in December, 4th, 
2006) of an “Austerity Decree” (Decreto de Austeridad, 2006). The Austerity Decree’s 
main explicit goal is to reach budgetary savings for 25,500 millions of pesos in 2007, 
“which will allow to maintain, improve, and intensify social programmes that have been 
effective for combating extreme poverty, given that social expenditure is the instrument 
that allow to Mexican people the universal access to health services, to quality public 
education, and to a life that is accord to their dignity” (p.1).  
In order to reach that goal, the Austerity Decree established a set of administrative 
measures to be implemented governmentwide. In the first place, the decree reduced in 
10% the wages of all senior level officials (most of them political appointees), including 
the President, State Secretaries and Undersecretaries, and the Heads of all federal 
agencies. In the second place, the decree established a 5% cut in FY2007 budget for all 
federal agencies (with the exception of national security agencies). In the third place, 
the decree also establishes additional measures that agencies should follow, such as 
reducing as much as possible all costs associated with membership to international 
organizations; promoting the consolidated acquisition of office materials, furniture, and 
IT services; and the implementation of new IT systems for management control, as well 
as new IT networks for internal communication. In the fourth place, according to the 
decree, all these administrative measures would need to be associated to the federal 
government’s new Programme for Management Improvement. Finally, it is stated that 
both the Ministry of Public Finances and the Ministry of Public Administration are 
responsible for preparing further implementing regulations. 
Although it is not clear yet whether the decree will reach its goal or not, a few points 
about its potentially problematic and paradoxical effects could be raised. To begin with, 
even if the Austerity Decree is basically a long list of proposed administrative changes, 
which seek to improve the management and control of budgetary and human resources, 
as well as the general management of public organizations, it could be said that it is 
mainly a political response to the highly contested 2006 presidential elections. In other 
words, despite its administrative content and implications, it would seem as though the 
decree’s main purpose was to positively impact public opinion, rather than to improve 
the internal working of the federal bureaucratic machine or even that of social policy 
programmes. 
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On the one hand, for the last few years some academics have raised the issue that the 
salary levels for senior public servants are too high for Mexico’s socioeconomic 
conditions, even when compared with salary levels in developed countries (Carrillo & 
Guerrero, 2002). Also, it is true that the overall management of the federal bureaucracy 
can still be improved, and that important long-term savings may be generated if newer, 
more efficient control and IT systems are put in place. On the other hand, some of the 
main contents of the decree are remarkably similar to those advocated by another 
former presidential candidate, whom announced that in the case of winning the 
presidency, he would cut government salaries, reduce government spending, and 
increase the funding for social programmes. In this sense, the Austerity decree looks 
more like a policy oriented to reduce the political polarization caused by the 2006 
electoral process, or an effort to approach President Calderón’s administration to left-
wing political groups (or both), than a clear set of measures for saving taxpayer’s 
money, improving bureaucratic performance, or obtaining additional resources for 
funding social policy programmes. 
A clearly paradoxical aspect of the Austerity Decree has to do with the implementation 
of new IT systems and networks. While the decree’s main goal is to produce savings 
(and better IT technologies could be certainly helpful for that), it is also true that the 
design and implementation of newer IT solutions tends to be very costly in several 
ways, at least in the short term. Thus, as it happened with some of President Fox’s Good 
Government Agenda’s strategic lines, the decree’s objective and its proposed actions in 
the IT field seem to be running in opposite ways, and some of the proposed savings 
might risk being cancelled out if the IT solutions are implemented. 
Similarly, an unintended effect, that partly arose as a consequence of the Austerity 
Decree’s implementation, is related to the way human resources are managed inside the 
federal government. As it has been mentioned before, the decree seeks to produce 
savings by improving internal control systems, including those for managing HR. But, 
for all practical purposes, this has basically meant that most middle-level civil service 
positions (those below the level of Deputy Director-General) that became vacant during 
FY2007, would be kept in that status until obtaining the Ministry of Public Finance’s 
clearance. The implicit argument for so doing was that, as long as there were vacancies, 
the government would be saving money for those salaries that were not being paid. 
However, this action did not necessarily take into account that understaffed agencies 
might not work as efficiently as it is needed, since some public goods and services may 
be underprovided; or public servants might simply become more prone to commit 
mistakes because of higher stress conditions and/or increased daily workloads. In this 
scenario, the government would be generating some monetary savings, but at the same 
time it might also be incurring into other non-quantifiable, non-visible expenditures. 
Above all, the underlying logic of the Austerity Decree revived the old idea in Mexico’s 
public administration that job vacancies should be kept in that status for as long as it is 
possible. In this perspective, human resources are a cost to be reduced, and not the 
indispensable asset that high-performing organizations require for providing high-
quality public services (Dussauge, 2004), as the creation of the Professional Civil 
Service in 2003 would imply. 
A second important initiative that has taken place during President Calderón’s first year 
is the publication (September, 6th, 2007) of a new set of rules for managing the 
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Professional Civil Service (Reglamento del Servicio Profesional de Carrera, 2007). This 
new regulatory framework attempts to decentralize the management of most HR 
systems to federal agencies that are part of the PCS system. From the Ministry’s 
perspective, this will provide agencies with increased flexibility for speeding up hiring 
procedures, as well as for better adapting training, developing, and appraising methods 
to each agency’s requirements. For balancing the decentralization measures, the new 
regulations also give the Ministry of Public Administration additional supervising 
authorities, in order to regularly check and assess the way in which agencies are 
recruiting and managing their personnel. 
At first glance, the reform sounds appropriate for at least two reasons. As it was 
mentioned above, the initial implementation of the PCS had been highly problematic, 
partially due to the Ministry of Public Administration’s tendency to over-centralize and 
over-regulate HR tools and activities (particularly those involved in hiring new civil 
servants) (Martínez Puón, 2006). In this sense, the new rules are certainly closer to the 
original intent of the Civil Service Law, which seek a more decentralized framework 
than the one that has been working during the past three years. And from an 
international perspective, the newer regulations look also adequate, as they are in tune 
with HRM decentralization trends that had been in vogue around the world for the last 
two decades (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2000; Suleiman, 2003). 
Yet, the recent experience in Mexico may also suggest that the outcomes of this reform 
might differ from those expected. In the first place, because some agencies have already 
shown (at least in some cases) their willingness and ability to avoid central controls, in 
order to influence the hiring process and benefit certain applicants (Ramos, 2007; Solís, 
2007; Martínez Puón, 2007). Therefore, by decentralizing hiring authorities in a cultural 
environment that has not evolved as quickly as the institutional (legal) framework, the 
civil service reform may not only increase HR flexibility, and speed up recruitment and 
selection procedures; it might also pose the risk of returning to patronagebased 
appointments, even if that is done after (supposedly) following merit-based procedures 
(Méndez, 2007). 
In the second place, in the last three years the Ministry of Public Administration 
(particularly its Civil Service Unit) has not adequately performed its overseeing role on 
agencies’ implementation of civil service procedures. Therefore, it would seem unlikely 
that this condition might radically change in the short term. By just increasing the 
supervisory authorities without looking at other current structural limitations (lack of 
personnel, adequate training, ill-designed organizational routines, contradictory 
instructions), the reform may simply overwhelm the Ministry of Public 
Administration’s staff with additional guidelines and bureaucratic activities, which may 
further decrease the effectiveness of the general control systems (Olsen, 2007; 
Dussauge, forthcoming). 
A third and final initiative that could be briefly discussed is the Programme for 
Management Improvement, PMI, which is based on the Chilean administrative reform 
experience (Programa de Mejoramiento de la Gestión, 2007). While the PMI is still at 
its final planning/design stages, it has already been under discussion with most federal 
agencies and the federal legislature. The PMI will probably become the most important 
administrative reform strategy of President Calderón’s term, equivalent to President 
Fox’s Good Government Agenda discussed above. It attempts to develop “medium term 
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(administrative) improvements that systematically orient the management of public 
organizations towards results achievement”. The PMI’s main objective is to “contribute 
with information about institutional performance and management, both for budgetary 
decision-making and for improving policies and programmes and accountability, with 
an objective assessment of both achieved and expected results of institutional activities. 
The focus of the program is to strengthen, gradually, institutional competencies and 
capacities, pushing for the adoption of this framework and leading public servants 
towards the achievement of impacts and results that have value for citizens” (p. 10). 
As in the case of the other initiatives, it could be argued that the PMI also comes with 
its own paradoxical aspects. Firstly, it is very clear that the PMI underlines the 
importance of results, performance, and programme evaluation as key components of 
effective public management. However, the design and future implementation of the 
PMI does not seem to have been preceded by a (more or less) rigorous assessment of 
the former Good Government Agenda’s achievements, failures, and unintended 
consequences. Similarly, it is not clear either whether the Mexican government chose 
the Chilean reform experience as a model after having assessed its performance “pros 
and cons” (including also an evaluation of other relevant international models of 
administrative reform and management for results [Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2000]). 
Because of all this, the Mexican government might be facing the risk of repeating some 
of the mistakes and limitations incurred by former administrative reform efforts in both 
Mexico and Chile. 
Secondly, by attempting to link performance, results, and evaluation with budgetary 
decisions, the PMI may well just end up as another failed reform effort. Because of its 
budgetary implications, the PMI (as well as the Austerity Decree discussed above) has 
put the Ministry of Finance back in the table of administrative reform discussions, 
jointly with the Ministry of Public Administration. While this is not necessarily a bad 
idea, it certainly comes with some risks. In the short term, the involvement of these two 
ministries (which clearly have different reform priorities/perspectives/values), may 
attract most of their attention into negotiating reform procedures, logistics, 
implementation details, and coordination issues. For an initiative as the PMI, which is 
built around the importance of outputs and outcomes, this strong focus on processes is a 
bit paradoxical, if not frankly problematic. 
In the longer term, the joint participation of these two agencies in designing and 
implementing the PMI may get even riskier, as shown by recent history. During the 
nineties, both ministries struggled around the issue of which of them should hold 
leadership and control over the administrative reform agenda. As a consequence, the 
development and implementation of a merit-based system for the federal government, 
which was part of President Ernesto Zedillo’s modernization agenda, remained stalled 
for the whole 1994-2000 presidential term (Guerrero, 1998; Arellano and Guerrero, 
2000). With the two ministries sharing again the design and implementation of the key 
administrative reform initiatives, one can only wonder whether the past (bad) 
experiences will happen again. 
But let us hope they will not. For there would not be a worse paradox for a reform 
initiative like the PMI, focused on performance and results, than to remain as yet 
another wishful thinking about how to reform the Mexican public sector. 
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